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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - PUBLISHED OPINIONS OF 
THE NEWT AX OFFICIALDOM: A REVIEW - President John F. Ken-
nedy has appointed as his principal tax officials two men who have 
long been on record as proponents of tax reform. This comment 
is a collection and, to a small extent, an analysis of the opinions 
found in their published statements on taxation.1 Stanley S. Sur-
rey, fifty-year-old Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax 
Policy, first served with the Treasury Department in 1937. He 
was Tax Legislative Counsel from 1942 to 1947 and later served 
as Special Counsel to the House Ways and Means Subcommittee 
on Administration of the Revenue Laws. He also has served as 
Reporter of the American Law Institute Tax Project and as a 
member of the Shoup Mission, which revised Japan's tax system 
after World War II. Mortimer Caplin, a forty-four-year-old pro-
fessor at the University of Virginia Law School when he was ap-
pointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is a member of the 
Tax Advisory Group of the American Law Institute. The two 
men have remarkably similar views on the general situation of the 
federal income tax today and on most of the reforms they advocate. 
Both fear a present and impending emasculation of the Internal 
Revenue Code by popular disrespect and a gradual narrowing of 
1 This comment does not cover in general the opinions of either official on taxation 
of income earned abroad, or the estate and gift taxes. 
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its base.2 The two factors, in their opinion, reinforce one another. 
Widespread lack of confidence in the essential fairness of the tax 
makes it easy for Congress to create tax shelters for pressure groups. 
Tax shelters for pressure groups, and the complex code provisions 
which they require, create further dissatisfaction. A two-pronged 
attack on the problem is proposed: first, elimination of tax shelters 
by legislation, litigation, and stronger enforcement; second, a re-
duction in rates to eliminate unfairness and congressional sympa-
thy for high-bracket taxpayers. 
I. THE RoLE MR. SURREY INTENDS To PLAY 
Mr. Surrey has clearly outlined the active role he believes the 
holder of his office should play.3 Mr. Caplin has published no 
opinions on the proper function of the Commissioner. Believing 
that tax policy and tax administration cannot and should not be 
separated, Mr. Surrey favors close coordination of Treasury policy 
and Bureau administration, with top-level contact between the 
Treasury and the Bureau primarily his responsibility. Aside from 
this coordinating function he feels that it is a prime responsibility 
of his office to oppose effectively pressure groups which urge crea-
tion of tax shelters. He believes the Treasury must be an out-
spoken champion of tax fairness, which he believes is embodied 
in a progressive tax with equality within brackets.4 He probably 
can be expected, in the course of performing this function, to give 
broad publicity to the low amounts of tax actually paid by certain 
high-income groups and to recommend legislation requiring that 
special proposals benefiting small groups be presented in the form 
of private relief bills.5 Mr. Surrey's previous Washington expe-
rience should be of considerable value to him in his forthcoming 
struggles with the lobbyists. 
Mr. Surrey's publications indicate, although this is difficult to 
substantiate by direct quotation, that where the statute is not 
precise he would favor more aggressive Treasury action toward 
developing new substantive tax law through the administrative 
2 The tax base is, roughly speaking, that income to which the ordinary income 
rates fully apply after taking into account the effect of exemptions, deductions, exclusions, 
income separately taxed and credits against tax. Caplin, Threats to the Integrity of Our 
Tax System, 44 VA. L. REv. (1958); Surrey, Do Income Tax Exemptions Make Sense1 
102 CoNG. REc. A3053 (1956). 
3 Surrey, Comment on the Proposal To Separate the Bureau of Internal Revenue-. 
from the Treasury Department, 8 TAX L. REv. 155 (1953). 
4 Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get 
Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1164 (1957). 
5 Id. at 1172, 1180. 
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and litigation processes.6 Mr. Caplin, on the other hand, may 
favor a closer adherence to the precise words of the statute, with 
less administrative emphasis on "substance over form." At least 
he has argued in this direction in the context of the thin-incorpo-
ration doctrine.7 
II. REASONS FOR AITACKING TAX SHELTERS 
It is Mr. Surrey's thesis that Congress has maintained the 
present high rate structure at the behest of certain pressure groups, 
and that it points to the rate structure in defense when its other 
tax legislation is attacked by those groups.8 However - his argu-
ment goes - Congress does not actually believe in high rates and 
promptly emasculates the rates by creating tax shelters which are 
not equally available to all taxpayers within a given rate bracket. 
Both Mr. Surrey and Mr. Caplin believe present upper-bracket 
rates are unfair because they are too high.9 For the most part their 
attack on tax shelters is based upon the inequities created within 
rate brackets and the complexity caused by the shelter provisions.10 
Occasionally, however, one or the other will move toward an 
attack on the shelters solely because they enable the rich to escape 
paying taxes.11 This latter viewpoint is somewhat inconsistent 
with Mr. Surrey's thesis that the shelters were intentionally created 
by Congress to mitigate the effect of rates he admits are too high. 
III. PROPOSED CHANGES IN ENFORCEMENT 
Along with changes in substantive law, the new officialdom 
wants tougher enforcement by an expanded and strengthened Rev-
enue Service.12 In April the Kennedy administration asked Con-
6 See generally Surrey, supra note 3. See also Surrey, Memorandum Regarding Certain 
Items in the List of Substantive Unintended Benefits, Hearings on Techical Amendments 
to the IRC Before a Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, 84th Cong., 
2d Sess., vol. 5, at 436 n.l (1956). 
7 Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 31, 54 (1959). 
But cf. Mr. Caplin's implied praise of judicial destruction of avoidance devices based on 
the letter of the code. Caplin, supra note 2, at 841. 
8 Surrey, supra note 4, at 1150; Surrey, Do Income Tax Exemptions Make Sense? 102 
CoNG, REc. A3053, A3055 (1956). 
o Caplin, supra note 2, at 844, 845; Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains 
Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 985, 1016 (1956). 
10 Caplin, supra note 2, at 839, 840. Surrey, supra note 4, at 1146, 1152. 
11 See, e.g., the criticism by both gentlemen of the dividends received credit. Caplin, 
supra note 2, at 845; Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58 CoLUM, 
L. REv. 815, 820, 821 (1958). See also Surrey, supra note 4, at 1179. 
12 Caplin, supra note 2, at 852; Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 
58 CoLUM. L. REv. 815, 827-28 (1958). 
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gress for thirty-four million dollars to hire 4265 more Internal 
Revenue Service employees, and Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy has announced plans to increase the prosecution of tax evasion 
cases.13 
The enforcement proposals of Mr. Surrey and Mr. Caplin are 
threefold: broader reporting requirements, greater withholding 
requirements, and more careful auditing by an expanded Revenue 
Service. Mr. Surrey would require more reporting from execu-
tives, employers, entrepreneurs, professional men, and farmers. 
From the executive he wants more detail, especially in regard to 
expense accounts.14 He would require employers to report sepa-
rately all payments, in cash, kind, or use of certain facilities, made 
to top executives and shareholders, whether or not the payments 
constitute gross income to the recipient. The Revenue Service 
would then be able to decide the latter point for itself.15 For 
farmers, entrepreneurs, and professional men he would require 
balance sheet reporting for those with non-investment, non-salary 
income in excess of fifteen or twenty thousand dollars. This re-
quirement would be extended down the income scale as details 
were worked out.16 
It has been estimated that three billion dollars of interest and 
dividends - principally the former- is now unreported17 and 
both men desire withholding of tax on interest and dividends as a 
remedy.18 A specific method has been suggested by Mr. Surrey: 
the debtor or corporation would withhold a flat percentage, equal 
to the rate of the first bracket, without allowance for exemptions. 
The recipient would then add the amount withheld to the amount 
received in reporting his income and receive a credit for the 
amount withheld. No individual withholding forms would be 
filed with the government by debtors or corporations. The method 
would insure at least some payment of the tax on all dividends 
and interest, and insure perfect compliance in the first bracket.10 
Both officials urge more efficient auditing.20 Mr. Surrey sug-
gests that committees of the American Bar Association Section on 
13 N.Y. Times, April 21, 1961, p. 19, col. 3 (city ed.). 
14 Surrey, supra note 12, at 827. 
15 lbid. 
l6Ibid. 
17 N.Y. Times, April 21, 1961, p. 18, col. 7 (city ed.). The President states that the 
effort to remedy the situation by education has failed. Ibid. 
18 Caplin, supra note 2, at 852; Surrey, supra note 12, at 827. 
19 Surrey, supra note 12, at 827 n.41. 
20 Caplin, supra note 2, at 852-53; Surrey, supra note 12, at 828. 
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Taxation and of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants be appointed to study the auditing procedure and sug-
gest methods for making it more effective.21 He has also made 
his own detailed suggestions for improving the auditing process:22 
I. Agents should be less susceptible to obvious errors left as 
"bait" to draw attention from substantial questionable 
items. 
2. Agents should make more thorough pursuit of obvious 
leads to information such as long-term reports on certified 
audits showing reserves for taxes, corporate minutes, and 
year-end accounting adjustments, which sometimes indicate 
questionable accounting practices. 
3. Agents should become acquainted in detail with taxpayers' 
accounting systems by such methods as tracing vouchers 
through the system and scanning inventory account sheets 
for distortions in pricing methods. 
4. Agents should check in detail the cost-of-goods-sold accounts 
and include a scanning of a list of vendors to taxpayer to 
tum up items purchased as fringe benefits for employees. 
5. Agents should not be guided in their audits solely by the 
classifications of items required by the tax return. 
IV. PROPOSED SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES 
The new officials have specifically designated a number of sub-
stantive provisions which they consider to be undesirable tax 
shelters. They have proposed legislative revisions of most of these 
provisions, and it is to be expected that the litigation and admin-
istrative processes will also be used to develop the law whenever 
practicable. Perhaps the most significant area of attack at the leg-
islative level is on the present treatment and definition of capital 
gam. 
A. The Capital Gains Provisions 
Both men urge revision of the capital gains provisions. Mr. 
Surrey has for some time continued a sweeping attack on the treat-
ment of capital gain. First, he feels there is nothing in the nature 
of a capital gain which requires its separate treatment purely for 
21 Surrey, supra note 12, at 828. 
22 Surrey, quoted in Methods of Improving Audits Performed by IRS Agents Discussed, 
8 J. TAXATION 109 (1958). 
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reasons of equity.28 Second, he believes capital gain cannot satis-
factorily be defined and that congressional and judicial attempts 
to do so cause one of the major complexities in our income tax 
law.24 Third, he believes the separate treatment of capital gain 
provides an easy and undesirable way by which Congress can create 
tax shelters for pressure groups by giving a non-investment trans-
action capital gains treatment in lieu of an out-and-out lower rate 
or averaging device.25 
I. Proposed Changes in Capital Gains Taxation. While both 
officials have made specific suggestions in the capital gains area, 
Mr. Surrey's proposals are the more detailed. First, he would solve 
the definitional problem primarily by making capital gain treat-
ment less desirable, thus easing the pressure on the definition.26 
He would also narrow the general definition to include, insofar as 
possible, only purely investment activities, but he has not been 
specific about this change in the general definition.27 
Second, he would raise the required holding period to three 
years, with perhaps a decreasing rate scaled to the length of the 
holding period in excess of this minimum.28 
Third, Mr. Surrey would raise the maximum capital gain rate 
to approximately forty-five percent and eliminate the deduction 
for one-half of long-term capital gain. As an alternative, he would 
consider applying the ordinary income rates coupled with a deduc-
tion of one-fourth to one-third of long-term capital gain. These 
are mutually exclusive proposals; Mr. Surrey apparently does not 
favor enacting both and giving the taxpayer a choice between the 
two methods. The first proposal is the one he emphasizes.20 
Fourth, he would increase the capital loss allowance, but he 
has not been specific as to the size of the increase.80 
Fifth, he would attempt to eliminate the tendency of a capital 
gains tax to deter transfers of appreciated assets - commonly called 
the lock-in effect- by (1) taxing unrealized capital gains at death 
23 Surrey, in Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I, at 320 (1955) [hereinafter cited 1955 Hearings]. 
24 See generally Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 985 (1956). 
25 Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 815, 819• 
20 (1958). 
26 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016, 1019; Surrey, supra note 25, at 819. 
27 Surrey, supra note 25, at 820; 1955 Hearings 327. 
28 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016. 
20 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016; 1955 Hearings 314, 344. 
so Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016; Surrey, supra note 25, at 880. 
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or gift, or (2) carrying over to the transferee the decedent's basis 
in a capital asset transferred at death. The method he emphasizes 
is taxing unrealized capital gains at death or gift.31 
Sixth, the new Assistant Secretary would permit "averaging" 
of capital gains by spreading them over the year of receipt and the 
two previous years.32 
Seventh, he would tighten provisions on corporate reorganiza-
tions and distributions. He has not been specific about the nature 
of this "tightening."33 
Eighth, he would eliminate completely capital gain treatment 
of a number of transactions which he believes do not involve sale 
of investment assets, but which he believes were afforded capital 
gain treatment as the result of astute lobbying and in lieu of lower 
rates or averaging. Included are executive stock options, lump-
sum termination of interests in pension trusts, sales of patents and 
patent royalties, sales of coal, oil, and timber royalties, sales of 
growing crops and breeding livestock, sales of real property and 
depreciable assets used in a trade or business, and the notorious 
Mayer34 provision.35 
In his comments on capital gains provisions, Mr. Caplin has 
cited the articles of then-Professor Surrey. However, his proposals, 
which are less numerous, differ in some details. Notable differ-
ences are that he mentions increasing the holding period to "at 
least one year," and proposes only one method for treating capital 
assets at death - carrying forward to the legatee the basis of the 
decedent. Upon sale of depreciable assets, he would deny capital 
gain treatment except to the extent the sale price exceeded the orig-
inal cost. With regard to the capital gain rate structure, he proposes 
to eliminate the twenty-five percent alternate tax and to force all 
taxpayers to use the fifty percent deduction. However, he, too, 
doubts the desirability of separate treatment of capital gain in the 
first place.36 
2. Mr. Surrey's Views on the Desirability of Separate Taxa-
tion of Capital Gain. Mr. Surrey has published his views upon 
31 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1018 n.95. 
32 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016. 
33Ibid. 
34 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954 § 1240. It is generally assumed that at the time of its 
enactment the provision was applicable only to Louis B. Mayer and one other executive 
of Loew's, Inc. Surrey, supra note 4, at 1147 n.4. 
315 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016; Surrey, supra note 25, at 819, 822; 1955 Hearings 314. 
36 Caplin, supra note 2, at 846. 
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five of the arguments often heard in the theoretical controversy 
which rages over the issue of separate tax treatment of capital gain. 
These are (I) an income tax should "tax the fruit but not the 
tree"; (2) a capital gains tax has a harmful "lock-in" effect; (3) a 
separate low rate on capital gains acts as a desirable stimulus to 
saving and investment in the economy as a whole; (4) a capital 
gains tax has the effect of a capital levy during a period of inflation; 
and (5) capital gains are generally realized "in a lump," and a 
low rate is therefore needed in lieu of an averaging device.37 
On the question of taxing the "tree" differently from the 
"fruit," Mr. Surrey says, "I start with the viewpoint that these capi-
tal gains are dollars received by people and are like any other dol-
lars. On equity grounds they therefore should be taxed the same as 
any other dollars."38 Walter Heller, Chairman of the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers, agrees with Mr. Surrey on this 
point.39 There are, of course, those who strongly disagree.40 
Mr. Surrey feels that under the present rate structure the lock-
in effect is not serious. He bases this opinion primarily upon argu-
ments of Mr. Heller.41 Mr. Heller's view, as expressed before 
Congress, is that the severity of the lock-in effect under the present 
rate structure has been greatly overrated. Mr. Heller bases his 
opinion on three grounds. First, he feels that many market trans-
actions are outside the deterrent effect of the capital gains tax 
because made by tax exempt organizations or made for compelling 
reasons which require that the tax be ignored.42 Second, he be-
lieves that in a dynamic market the change in values necessary to 
compensate for the effect of a tax at transfer is relatively small. 
For example, he states that "stockholders who accurately gaged 
the pulse of the market" could easily more than compensate them-
selves for the effect of the tax by proper trading in thirty major 
stocks during 1955.43 However, he admits the lock-in effect may 
37 For vieivs generally opposed to those of Mr. Surrey on the capital gain question, see 
Dan Throop Smith, Tax Treatment of Capital Gains, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS &: 
MEANS, TAX R.EvISION CoMPENDIUM 1233 (1959) [hereinafter cited 1959 CoMPENDIUM]; 
Brown, 1955 Hearings 307; Magill, Federal Income Tax Revision, in 1959 CoMPENDIUM 87. 
SB 1955 Hearings 320. 
891955 Hearings 310, 318. 
40 See note 37 supra. 
41 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1018 n.95. 
42 Heller, Investors' Decisions, Equity, and the Capital Gains Tax, in JOINT CoMM, 
ON THE ECONOMIC R.EPoR.T, FEDER.AL TAX PouCY :FOR. ECONOMIC GR.OWTii AND STABIUTY 
381, 385-86 (1955). 
43Id. at 384-85. 
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not be dismissed as insignificant upon this ground alone because 
the investor must trade a certain tax for an uncertain market 
change and because the tax may have a psychological effect unre-
lated to mathematics.44 
Mr. Heller's third ground for doubting the severity of the 
lock-in effect is a study of the impact of taxes upon the decisions 
of 746 investors made under the auspices of the Harvard Business 
School. When asked whether federal taxes affected their invest-
ments only ten percent of the upper bracket investors in the group 
studied volunteered answers indicating that the long term capital 
gains tax affected the timing of a shift in their investments.45 The 
two questions asked of the group were very general in nature and 
were directed primarily at ascertaining the tax effects upon the 
investment capacity of the individuals and the types of investments 
which they selected.46 The authors of the study state that the na-
ture of the questions probably resulted in significantly fewer 
answers directed to the lock-in effect than would have been the 
case if the questions had been aimed more specifically at that 
consideration.47 The 746 individuals studied were selected from 
persons in various cities whose names were contained in the cus-
tomer files of stockbrokers. The authors of the study admit the 
possibility of the inclusion of a disproportionate number of active 
traders but say this is unlikely because at the wealth levels within 
which the study was primarily made most persons mvn stock and 
even those who do not are likely to be on brokers' customer lists.48 
Mr. Surrey believes the lock-in effect would become harmful 
if the capital gain rate were raised and the other Code provisions, 
including ordinary income rates, remained the same.49 This view 
is shared by several economists, including Mr. Heller.60 Mr. Sur-
rey, again with Mr. Heller concurring,51 would solve this problem 
by taxing unrealized capital gains upon transfers of property at 
death or by gift, with a carry-over basis as an alternative legislative 
proposal.52 The first method would cause serious liquidity problems 
•H Id. at 386. 
45 Id. at 384. The study upon which Mr. Heller relies is BUTIERS, THOMPSON & 
BOLLINGER, EFF.ECrS OF TAXATION [oN] INVESTMENT :SY INDIVIDUALS (1953). 
46 BUTIERS, THOMPSON & BOLLINGER, op. cit. supra note 45, at 45, 513. 
47 Id. at 45, 340, 341, 348, 513. 
48Id. at 12,348,452,456. 
49 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1018 n.95. 
50 See the view of Heller, Carl Shoup, and J. Keith Butters, in 1955 Hearings 310, 
311, 314. 
511955 Hearings 310. 
li2 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1018 n.95. 
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for a substantial percentage of estates,53 and particularly of small 
estates. The extreme nature of the problem where decedent owned 
a non-liquid family business is obvious. The Surrey solution could 
not be completely effective to the extent that investors, being 
human, will delay a transaction which causes a tax to be levied 
immediately although the tax appears to be inevitable. In addi-
tion, the investor will receive the income from the funds which 
would pay the tax, so long as he delays the transaction. The diffi-
culties involved in solution of the lock-in problem, among other 
things, have led a number of authors to propose a "rollover" pro-
vision for capital assets, whereby gain would not be recognized and 
basis would be carried over if the funds received from sale of a 
capital asset were reinvested within a certain time. Gain not prop-
erly reinvested would be taxed.54 In this context and in the 
context of the averaging problem, Mr. Surrey stated that he be-
lieves nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from taxing 
each year the increase in value of an asset, whether or not the 
increase has been realized.55 He has suggested no such legislation. 
The administrative problems are obvious. He has proposed an 
averaging provision for capital gains. 
A substantial number of economists feel that the lower rate on 
capital gain has made possible an adequate amount of savings and 
investment despite extremely high rates on the ordinary income 
of those taxpayers who do the significant saving and investing.58 
It is only in deference to this view that Mr. Surrey would retain 
any separate rate treatment of capital gain.57 He does not believe 
that his proposed maximum rate of approximately forty-five per-
cent, coupled with lower ordinary income rates, increased allow-
ance for capital losses, and full taxation of the interest from state 
and municipal bonds would have any harmful effect on the econ-
omy.58 His views are supported by some economists.59 There are, 
53 If unrealized gains were constructively realized at death in those estates now taxed 
under the estate tax, the total taxes to be paid at death would be increased- in the 
aggregate- by 40%, The percentage increase would be greatest for smaller estates. Steger, 
Economic Consequences of Substantial Changes in the Method of Taxing Capital Gains 
and Losses, in 2 1959 Cm.lPENDIUM 1261, 1280 (1959). 
54 See, e.g., Dan Throop Smith, supra note 37; Clark, The Paradox of Capital Gains: 
Taxable Income That Ought Not To Be Currently Taxed, in 2 1959 COMPENDIUM 1243, 
1247; Miller, Taxation of Capital Gains, in 2 1959 COMPENDIUM 1257; Silverstein, The 
Capital Asset Definition, in 2 1959 CoMPENDIUM 1285, 1295. 
551955 Hearings 323, 
56 See the following opinions: Heller, Shoup and Butters in 1955 Hearings, 310, 311, 
314; Paul McCracken, in 1955 Hearings 97; Dan Throop Smith, supra note 37. 
57 1955 Hearings 320. 
58 1955 Hearings 344. 
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of course, those who believe any increase in the capital gain rate 
would be harmful,60 and perhaps those who believe capital gain 
could be treated as ordinary income with no ill effects.61 
After any period of inflation, especially one of the nature and 
duration experienced by the United States in the past twenty years, 
a portion of most realized capital gains will be illusory. From time 
to time proposals are advanced which are designed to take closer 
account of this fact in taxing capital gain. 62 The administrative 
difficulties would be formidable. Moreover, there are those who 
believe a capital gains tax on the illusory value has a desirable 
counter-cyclical economic effect. 63 It is arguable that any separate 
and lower rate on capital gains, including the present separate rate 
structure, does some measure of rough justice in an inflationary 
period.64 Mr. Surrey's proposed maximum rate of forty-five per-
cent would give no relief from ordinary income rates to the small 
investor whose rate is already beneath forty-five percent. It is, of 
course, impossible to determine to what extent such small investors 
who have held property since the early forties view the present 
treatment of capital gain as a rough allowance for inflated property 
values. To the extent that they do so, they will presumably be 
strongly opposed to Mr. Surrey's proposal to take away the "allow-
ance." 
Mr. Surrey himself does not believe the income tax, including 
the capital gains tax, should take inflation into account. Further-
more, he believes it to be equitable to put an additional tax bite 
on the investor who has a hedge against inflation, because those 
on a fixed income have no hedge. He goes on to say that we will 
be lost in the wilderness if we try to separate illusory gain from 
real gain, a position ·widely held.65 However, his statement that 
we should tax the investor upon illusory gains because some people 
have no illusory gains is open to criticism. There seems to be no 
more equity in trying to put the investor who shifts investments 
rm See the following opinions: Heller, Shoup, and Butters, in 1955 Hearings 310, 311, 
814. 
60 Brown, in 1955 Hearings 307; Dan Throop Smith, supra note 37; Magill, supra 
note 37; cf. McCracken, in 1955 Hearings 97. 
61 Cf. Groves, Taxation of Capital Gains, in 2 1959 CoMPENDIUM 1193. 
62 See, e.g., Corbin, New Proposals for Capital Gains Taxation, 34 TAXES 663, 668 
(1956); Uhr, Implications of "New Proposals for Capital Gains Taxation," 35 TAXES 267 
(1957). 
63See, e.g., Heller, in 1955 Hearings 328,347. 
64 Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247, 255 (1957). 
65 1955 Hearings 330. 
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in the position of the recipient of a fixed income than in trying 
to put such an investor in the position of the wage earner, who 
suffers only one additional tax as a result of inflation and thus is 
better off than the investor for the following reasons. The wage 
earner has been on the whole quite able to maintain his relative 
income position during the period of inflation since World War 
II.66 As the wage earner's income rises during inflation he pays 
more income tax. During a period of inflation, ceteris paribus, 
the investor's income from his property will rise and he will also 
pay more income tax. The value of his property will rise to reflect 
its increased production of income. If the investor changes the 
form of his property he realizes the inflationary gain, pays a capital 
gains tax, and is left with fewer dollars to invest. After reinvest-
ment he will have fewer dollars of disposable income than before, 
and thus is hurt more than the wage earner, who is not forced to 
capitalize his earning power and pay a tax on its increase when he 
changes jobs. 
3. Mr. Surrey's Views on the Definition of Capital Gain. Mr. 
Surrey's criticisms of the nature and complexities of the statutory 
definition of capital gains. are lengthy and effective. His views are 
necessarily affected by the fact that he does not believe separate 
taxation of capital gain is desirable in the first place. In another 
narrower area, that of multiple trusts, he is willing to 1\Trestle with 
an extremely difficult definition when he believes that definition 
to be necessary for equitable taxation.67 In the capital gains area 
he apparently concludes that a truly satisfactory definition of cap-
ital gain is impossible, and that the best to be hoped for is an 
uneasy truce between taxpayer and government.68 Mr. Heller is 
apparently not in complete accord on the non-availability of a 
satisfactory working definition. 69 
Mr. Surrey states that Congress, in defining capital gain, has 
attempted the difficult task of separating investment activities from 
business activities, speculation, and the rewards of personal effort70 
and that the difficulties of so doing are compounded by tax recog-
nition of corporations and partnerships as separate entities for 
some purposes.71 In general, he feels most of the present defini-
66 Bach, in 1955 Hearings 48, 54. 
67 See text accompanying note 120 infra. 
68 Surrey, in 1955 Hearings 324. 
69 Heller, in 1955 Hearings 345. 
70 Surrey, supra note 24, at 990, 999, 1001. 
71Id. at 1008-15. 
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tional provisions are too specific.72 The distinction between in-
vestment gain and business gain is now enforced primarily by the 
definition of capital assets. Mr. Surrey apparently believes this tool 
should be accompanied by further congressional distinctions 
among the causes of an increase in the value of property - for 
example, between rises attributable to taxpayers' individual efforts 
and those not so attributable.78 Further, he criticizes the defini-
tion of a capital asset because of its broad inclusion - "property" -
coupled with specific exclusions. He impliedly would favor the 
method of a broad exclusion with specific inclusions.74 
In the area of distinguishing speculation from investment, Mr. 
Surrey is highly critical of the present short holding period, and 
of the exclusive use of the holding period to separate speculators 
from investors.75 He, of course, proposes a longer holding period, 
which would eliminate many problems in this area and in the 
business-investment distinction area as well. Mr. Surrey and Mr. 
Caplin both have repeatedly criticized the present capital gain 
treatment of the large-scale exchange speculator who holds for 
over six months.76 Mr. Surrey discusses the fact that such activity 
has been held to be a trade or business, but that the assets were not 
found to be held for sale to customers.77 In the same article he 
discusses the Corn Products Refining Company case,78 where the 
Supreme Court found corn futures to be non-capital assets although 
not held for sale to customers in the ordinary sense of the phrase. 
Neither Mr. Surrey nor Mr. Caplin expressly suggests the follow-
ing, but it is conceivable in view of their opposition to capital gain 
for professional speculators that they might try to tax such specu-
lators' gains as ordinary income under the rationale of Corn 
Products. 
Mr. Surrey's most telling examples of 'the difficulty of the cap-
ital gains definition are in the area where the separate treatment 
of the corporate entity complicates the problem. For example, he 
cites the problems of corporate liquidations, distributions, accu-
mulation of income, and the transfer of appreciated non-capital 
12 Jd. at 1016. 
78 Surrey, supra note 24, at 988. 
74/bid. 
75 Id. at 999. 
76 Caplin, supra note 2, at 843; Surrey, supra note 24, at 1000; Surrey, supra note 25, 
at 819 n.21. 
77 Surrey, supra note 24, at 992, 1000. 
78 Com Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Surrey, supra note 
24, at 992. 
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assets into a corporate shell followed by sale of the stock.70 Many 
of these problems would melt away if a feasible method could be 
devised and enacted to tax undistributed corporate profits directly 
to shareholders, but no such plan appears to be in the offing. 
B. The "Double Tax" on Corporate Profits 
I. The Dividends Received Credit. Both men favor elim-
ination of the dividends received credit and exclusion.80 Mr. Sur-
rey is opposed to these provisions because they are not sufficiently 
geared to the amount of overtaxation suffered by the recipient of 
dividends and ordinarily, he feels, give greater proportionate re-
lief from overtaxation to the high-bracket taxpayer.81 He does not 
seem particularly concerned about giving alternative relief, but 
does feel that if Congress decides to do so the English method for 
taking account of the corporate tax should be adopted. This 
method, in brief, is to add to dividends received the corporate tax 
paid thereon and include the total in the recipients' income; a 
credit of the amount of the corporate tax paid is then given to the 
taxpayer.82 However, there would be certain difficulties involved 
in the adoption of such a plan, such as numerous refunds and some 
windfalls to shareholders.83 Mr. Surrey has not otherwise ad-
dressed himself specifically to the problems of double taxation and 
taxation of retained corporate profits, except as these problems 
affect the capital gain provisions. Neither he nor Mr. Caplin has 
mentioned in publication any plan for a reduction of corporate 
tax rates. 
2. A Solution of the "Double Taxation" Problem Proposed 
by Mr. Caplin. Mr. Surrey, while he has not written specifically 
on the double taxation problem, recognizes the historical trend 
toward attempting to eliminate two taxes on the same income. 
Mr. Caplin, however, in a recent article, has advocated a some-
what startling approach-a large step in the other direction. He 
would divide all business enterprises into two groups. The first 
of these would have an extremely low limitation on the number 
of shareholders or members and on net worth. Enterprises in this 
79 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1008-15. 
so Caplin, supra note 2, at 845. Surrey, supra note 25, at 820-21. 
81 Surrey, supra note 25, at 820-21. 
82 Id. at 821 n.25. 
83 Shoup, The Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the Revenue Code of 1954, 8 NAT'L 
TAX J. 136, 145 (1955); Dan Throop Smith, Two Years of Republican Tax Policy: An 
Economic Appraisal, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 2, 9 (1955). 
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group would be taxed generally as partnerships are now taxed. 
The second group would consist of all other business enterprises, 
whether now designated corporations, partnerships, associations, 
trusts, proprietorships, or what-have-you. Enterprises in the sec-
ond group would be taxed on their taxable income on a schedule 
of sharply progressive rates beginning at ten percent and rising as 
high as revenue needs require. Owners of such enterprises would 
include in their incomes the distributions of the enterprises, in 
accord with earnings and profits principles now applied to cor-
porations.84 
Mr. Caplin offers such a scheme as a solution to the complexities 
now arising from the numerous available taxable business entities 
and the differences between them: corporation, partnership, sub-
chapter S, subchapter R, association, proprietorship, trust.85 His 
plan would itself create substantial complexities, however. If his 
scheme were enacted it would still be necessary to categorize items 
of income according to their source. Obviously he would want 
to distinguish personal effort income-salaries and wages-from 
business enterprise income, for the latter would be taxed twice if 
distributed. Since these two categories do not neatly cover all 
types of income, presumably there would have to be a third cate-
gory for "non-enterprise income" which would arise neither from 
personal efforts nor from an enterprise. The necessary existence 
of this third category covering such items as interest, rents, and 
royalties would continue tax discrimination among items of in-
come not attributable solely to personal efforts. For example, if 
a coal royalty were not enterprise income, would there not still be 
discrimination between the royalty holder and the owner of the 
mining operation, which would pay an enterprise tax? Is the ex-
istence of an "enterprise" sufficient or desirable reason for such 
discrimination? 
The use of a business enterprise concept would require a 
broader use of the difficult distinction between income from a 
business enterprise and income from a non-enterprise. The dis-
tinction would presumably be somewhat similar to those now used 
in defining a "trade or business" for capital gains86 and section 162 
84 Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organization: ls It Time 
for a "Doing Business" Tax? 47 VA. L. R.Ev. 249, 260 (1961). 
85 Id. at 261. 
80 INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1221. 
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purposes,87 and an "association" for corporate taxation purposes.BB 
The distinction in the case of the coal royalty and the coal mining 
operation is fairly clear, but the in-between cases would be harder. 
Further, what should be done about businesses performing services 
for customers? For instance, would an individual stock broker, com-
mission broker, realtor, or Ia-wyer be engaged in an enterprise? If 
not, would a large brokers' partnership, or a large law firm, or a 
large real estate dealers' partnership? 
The distinction between personal effort income and enterprise 
income would also be difficult. The problem, of course, is now 
faced to a limited degree in the context of the closely-held corpora-
tion when an officer-shareholder receives an excessive "salary." 
Mr. Caplin's plan would require an extension of the distinction to 
most large partnerships and associations. If the enterprise classifi-
cation included large areas of economic activity now organized in 
partnership form, there would be few "yardsticks" with which a 
partner's income could be measured to determine how much was 
properly salary and how much properly enterprise income. For 
instance, how would one determine what portion of a senior law 
partner's inc,ome is properly attributable to his personal efforts? 
To begin treating a large number of enterprises as corporations 
are now treated would considerably increase the number of tax-
payers who must wrestle with all the problems of corporate distri-
bution, including earnings and profits, mergers, redemptions, 
liquidations, and sales of shares.B9 Furthermore, a progressive 
rate and the exemption of small enterprises would greatly increase 
the advantage of multiple entities, thus enormously expanding the 
pressures and complexities surrounding those sections dealing 
with multiple entities-269, 482, 1501, 1551 and the like.90 
The complexities which Mr. Caplin seeks to eliminate are in-
deed severe, but they have for the most part been dealt with for 
some time by the tax bar, the revenue service, the courts, Congress, 
and the taxpaying public. The process of education in their 
intricacies is to some degree accomplished. Mr. Caplin's proposal 
would require substantial re-education in new complexities. 
Finally, it is not clear to what extent the present corporate tax 
is a regressive tax passed on to the consumer or to the wage earner. 
B7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162. 
BB INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7701. 
89 lNT. REv. CoDJLOF 1954, §§ 301-82. 
90 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 269, 482, 1501, 1551. 
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Many feel that a substantial part of it is so passed on.01 If Mr. 
Caplin's proposed tax were passed on it would affect more con-
sumers than the present corporate tax, which reaches only pur-
chasers from corporations. On the other hand, the progressive 
nature of the proposed tax would prevent large enterprises from 
passing to the consumer as great a proportion of the tax as their 
smaller competitors could. Although this might take some tax 
burden off the consumer, it would endanger the competitive posi-
tion and the after-tax profit margin of large enterprises. Further-
more, a progressive tax appears unsuited to business enterprises 
because it cannot take into account the varying sizes of the incomes 
of the shareholders in a multi-shareholder enterprise. 
C. Mr. Caplin's Opinions on Certain Narrower 
Corporate Taxation Issues 
Mr. Caplin has addressed himself to several other problems in 
the corporate area, including subchapter S, the thin-incorporation 
doctrine, certain of the problems in the spin-off area, and sub-
chapter R. Basically he believes the fiction of the separate cor-
porate entity to be one of the cornerstones of our tax law and not 
lightly to be disregarded.92 He is opposed, however, to creation of 
new types of taxable entities.93 On this latter ground he has 
strongly attacked subchapter S, urging that it either be repealed 
in toto or amended to conform as precisely as possible to the pro-
visions for taxing partnerships. If the latter approach is taken, he 
has made ten recommendations to the legislators,94 all generally 
intended to bring subchapter S treatment closer to partnership 
treatment: 
I. Limit election to new corporations, and make the earn-
ings and profits account, if still used, coincide exactly 
with taxable income. Such treatment is proposed in 
order to eliminate the problems now encountered in 
handling pre-election earnings and profits. 
2. Put a dollar limit on net worth and eliminate the re-
strictions on personal holding company income. 
91 Darling, Income Taxation and Dividend Income, in 3 1959 CoMPENDIUllr 1579, 1580. 
92 Caplin, supra note 7, at 54. 
93 Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program, 46 VA. L. 
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Limit the events causing termination of the election to 
increase flexibility of the subchapter S device in some 
situations and minimize avoidance in others. 
Curtail severely the right to renew the election to mini-
mize avoidance. 
Treat the fiscal year problem as it is treated in the part-
nership provisions, again to eliminate possibilities of 
avoidance. 
Allocate taxable income for any part of a year to the 
shareholdings as they were during that part of the year to 
prevent shifting of accrued income. 
Do not allow shareholders to be deemed employees ex-
cept in limited cases. 
Allow distributions in kind to be made in the same 
manner as distributions in cash. 
Preserve the non-dividend status of previously-taxed in-
come despite termination of the election or sale of stock. 
Allow more latitude generally in withdrawals. 
Treat net operating loss as it is treated in the partner-
ship provisions-allow the excess over basis to be taken 
whenever a basis is restored. 
In the context of the thin-incorporation doctrine, Mr. Caplin 
believes the courts have gone too far in preferring substance over 
form. He believes the statute says "interest" and "dividends," and 
clear debt instruments should not be denied debt status absent 
evidence of intent not to have a debtor-creditor relationship.911 
In the application of section 355, Mr. Caplin has urged a liberal 
construction of the five-year active business requirement, with the 
government's main protection against avoidance transactions being 
the "device" terminology of section 355 (a) (1) (B).96 Both Mr. 
Surrey and Mr. Caplin have spoken disparagingly of section 1361, 
which permits a narrowly-limited class of partnerships to elect to 
be taxed as corporations.97 
D. The Depletion Allowances 
The depletion allowances have long been a target of tax re-
formers and Messrs. Surrey and Caplin are among the attackers. 
95 Caplin, supra note 7, at 61. 
96 Caplin, The Five-Year Business Rule for Corporate Separations, 35 TAXES 381, 390 
(1957). 
97 Caplin, supra note 84, at 261; Surrey, supra note 4, at 1147 n.4 (i). 
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Mr. Surrey refers to the allowances as an unwarranted tax pref-
erence deserving serious congressional study.08 Mr. Caplin has 
been more specific; he would lower all percentage rates and allow 
the new percentages only until capitalized costs were recovered.99 
The rate reduction advocated by the two men100 would mitigate 
to some degree the effect of the loss of the depletion allowance.101 
However, to the extent that the loss of the depletion allowance 
did not result in a rise in retail mineral prices, it would cause the 
price of mineral property to fall in relation to the price of other 
property, and this would indeed hurt the individual holders of 
mineral properties. The question of the extent to which mineral 
retail prices would rise leads to the consideration of the corporate 
position in the depletion picture. 
A substantial majority of the depletion dollars go to large cor-
porations.102 No decrease in the tax rate for these corporations has 
been proposed, and the loss of the depletion allowance would bite 
deeply here. The bite would pass on to humans in one of two 
directions: to the consumer in the form of higher prices on petro-
leum products and by-products and to the stock.holder in the form 
of lower dividends. To the extent that the depletion allowance 
has heretofore been reflected in lower mineral prices to consumers, 
there would seem to be no injustice in shifting the burden of the 
allowance from the government to the consumer. But one can 
have more sympathy for injury suffered in the form of lower 
dividends and stock prices by one who purchased shares in an oil 
company at a price which discounted the existence of the depletion 
allowance. 
E. The Exemption of State and Municipal Bond Interest 
Mr. Surrey calls the exemption of interest on state and local 
bonds indefensible in terms of income tax policy. It is, he says, 
an undesirable solution of federal-state relationships with the 
wealthy an undeserving third-party beneficiary. He favors full 
taxation of the interest and believes the constitutionality of such a 
tax no longer debatable.103 
98 Surrey, supra note 25, 819. 
oo Caplin, supra note 2, at 849. 
100 While the two officials speak generally of a 25% reduction in rates, they also speak 
of lowering the maximum rate to 65%, which is slightly more than a 25% reduction. 
101 lNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613 (b). 
102 Gray, in 1955 Hearings 351; Stanley, in 1955 Hearings 384. 
103 Surrey, supra note 25, at 817, 818. 
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F. The Personal Deductions 
I. The Deduction for Charitable Contributions. Nearly all 
of the personal deductions are under fire by both men. A major 
emphasis is placed on the deduction for charitable contributions. 
Mr. Caplin recommends that the deduction in all cases be limited 
to the lower of fair market value or basis. He favors such a provi-
sion as a method of eliminating a number of avoidance schemes 
and solving as well the problem of gifts of section 306 stock to 
charities.104 Mr. Surrey takes a slightly different tack. He rec-
ommends inclusion in the taxpayer's income of the difference be-
tween basis and fair market value, especially if the appreciation 
not realized would have been ordinary income to the donor. If 
the income not realized would have been capital gain, he is willing 
to make an exception if the pressure for such an exception is 
strong.105 In 1956 he recommended such a statutory change, but 
significantly wondered aloud why the Treasury had not, in all 
cases, attempted to tax the appreciation in value to the donor 
under the case law of section 61.1°6 He cited Austin v. Commis-
sioner101 and Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner.108 In addition, 
Helvering v. Horst,109 Commissioner v. First State Bank of Strat-
ford,110 and United States v. General Shoe Corp.111 would seem 
to be applicable. Mr. Surrey also urges a denial of deductions 
for all expenses incurred in building up the value of an asset 
donated to charity.112 Both gentlemen believe the family charitable 
foundation deserves scrutiny.113 
2. The Interest Deduction. Mr. Caplin urges denial of the 
interest deduction on all loans made to purchase life insurance.114 
Mr. Surrey goes farther. He urges first that a maximum be put 
104 Caplin, supra note 2, at 849. 
105 Surrey, Memorandum Regarding Certain Items in the List of Substantive Unin• 
tended Benefits, Hearings on Technical Amendments to the IRC Before a Subcommittee 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 5, at 436 (1956). 
106 Ibid. After losing on two attempts to tax as income to the donor the appreciation 
in the value of farm products donated to charity, the Commissioner in 1955 issued a 
ruling that such appreciation would not be taxed to the donor. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); White v. Broderick, 104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952); REv. RuL. 
55-138, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 223. 
107161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947). 
108 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946). 
109 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
110 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948). 
111282 F .2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960). 
112 Surrey, supra note 105, at 436. 
113 Caplin, supra note 2, at 849; Surrey, supra note 25, at 826. 
114 Caplin, supra note 2, at 851. 
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on the amount of the deduction. Second, he urges a broadening 
of sections 264 (a) (2) and 265 (2) plus the enactment and vigorous 
enforcement of a broad in terrorem provision denying the deduc-
tion whenever a transaction lacks business reality. The transaction 
would be deemed to lack business reality whenever its prime end 
was only the deduction plus a sale at capital gain rates, a gift to 
charity, or the like.111s 
3. The Deductions for State and Local Taxes, Medical Ex-
penses and Casualty Losses. Mr. Surrey favors retention of the 
deduction for state income taxes, elimination of the deduction for 
state excise taxes, and a maximum limit on the deduction for state 
property taxes.116 He sees the latter deduction as an unjustified 
subsidy to home owners and mortgagors.117 Defenders of states 
rights would object to Mr. Surrey's foregoing proposals on the 
ground that if the federal government is to make an allowance for 
the revenue needs of the states, it should not discriminate in favor 
of citizens of states raising the major portion of their revenue by 
an income tax and against citizens of those raising the major por-
tion of their revenue by excise or property taxes. Arguably, 
dictating the revenue-raising methods of the states is not the proper 
concern of the federal government. 
Mr. Surrey would raise the present "three percent of adjusted 
gross" limitation on the medical deduction to five percent and 
institute a similar limitation on deductions for casualty losses.118 
Along with the restrictions on the personal deductions, he favors 
a lowering of the ten percent standard deduction to three or four 
percent.11° 
G. Miscellaneous Areas of Avoidance: Multiple Trusts, 
Life Insurance, Sales of Life Interests, 
Deferred Compensation 
I. Multiple Trusts. In response to congressional committees, 
Mr. Surrey has addressed himself to several less significant areas 
where he believes unjustified tax avoidance occurs. Included are 
multiple trusts, life insurance, sale of life interests, and deferred 
compensation plans. In the multiple trust area he sees three prime 
llts Surrey, supra note 25, at 826; Surrey, supra note 105, at 437. 
116 Surrey, supra note 25, at 826, 827. 
117 Ibid. 
11s Id. at 825, 826. 
110 Id. at 826. Mr. Surrey says 3 or 4% of gross income, but he must mean adjusted 
gross income. 
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avoidance patterns: (1) the use of a large number of accumulation 
trusts with a common beneficiary; (2) the transfer of undivided 
interests in an appreciated asset whose sale will produce ordinary 
income, to multiple trusts prior to sale, investment of proceeds, 
and accumulation of income; and (3) the use of multiple trusts 
each distributing at intervals of six or more years to avoid the five-
year throwback rule.120 
He proposes a threefold attack. First, he would either com-
pletely eliminate the exception to the throwback rule for termina-
tion of trusts in existence over nine years; or he would modify the 
exception to require that the trust have been in existence beyond 
the lives of beneficiaries living when the trust was created. Second, 
he would allow the benefit of only one of each of the following 
provisions to a beneficiary of more than one trust: the $2,000 
floor on the throwback rule, the limitation of the throwback rule 
to five years, and the exception to the throwback rule for accumula-
tions during minority. Third, in addition to, and possibly as a 
substitute for, the second attack, he would require combination 
of multiple trusts into one trust for tax purposes. Trusts would 
be combined where each trust accumulates income for the same 
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries.121 He favors a broad general 
rule, supported by regulations and applied case by case, as a 
standard for requiring combination.122 He has given a suggestion 
of what should be included in such a rule: 
"Thus, trust income could be regarded as being accumulated 
for a beneficiary if in the normal operation of the trust, under 
the happening of events reasonably to be expected or which 
are anticipated in the trust instrument~ it is a reasonable con-
clusion that the accumulated income will either be distributed 
to that beneficiary or its disposition will become subject to his 
control. A class of beneficiaries could be treated as a single 
beneficiary if the interests of the class in the trust make that 
treatment appropriate. "123 
It is not entirely clear under the above standard whether combina-
tion would be required merely because a disposition to certain 
beneficiaries upon happening of a very unlikely event had been 
expressly anticipated in the trust. It is doubtful that combination 
should be required in such a case. Mr. Surrey recognizes the 
120 Surrey, supra note 105, at 439. 
121 Id. at 439. 
122 Id. at 440. 
123 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
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difficulty of administering a rule such as he suggests, but he feels 
the result here justifies the complexity-in noticeable contrast to 
his feeling that the result did not justify the complexity in the 
capital gains area. It seems quite likely that the enactment of such 
a forced-combination provision would result in a proliferation of 
often-muddy case law similar to that which sprang up around the 
Clifford doctrine124 prior to its codification. However, if it is 
desirable to attack the multiple trust problem, it might be best 
from a legislative standpoint to commence the attack with a broad 
provision, such as Mr. Surrey suggests, and clarify with codification 
only after the various problems and patterns had been thoroughly 
learned during development of the case law. Mr. Surrey is op-
posed to making proof that the multiplicity has as its prime pur-
pose the avoidance of taxes a requirement for combination. He 
feels the simple existence of two trusts with one beneficiary is 
sufficient reason for combination. He would not make allowances 
for the situation, for example, where because of quirks of local 
law the estate planner sets up both an inter vivas and a testamen-
tary trust for the same beneficiaries.125 
2. Life Insurance. The failure to tax interest earned upon 
life insurance premiums during the lifetime of the insured is re-
garded by both officials as undesirable.126 Neither has proposed 
a change in the law, however, and Mr. Surrey regards such a 
change as politically unfeasible.127 Although this comment does 
not deal generally with the estate tax, it is worthy of note that 
important changes are proposed in the life insurance area. Mr. 
Caplin impliedly would favor restoration of the payment of premi-
ums as a test for inclusion of life insurance in the gross estate;128 
Mr. Surrey has expressly proposed its restoration.129 Mr. Surrey 
has made further proposals in order to equate the treatment of 
life insurance with annuities and accumulation trusts. He would 
repeal section 2037 (a) (2)130 and thus include in the gross estate 
any property the enjoyment of which could be obtained only by 
surviving decedent. A similar change would be made in section 
124 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). For comments on the ensuing case law, 
see Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 1945); Suhl' v. Commissioner, 
126 F.2d 283, 288 (6th Cir. 1942). 
121l Surrey, supra note 105, at 441. 
120 Caplin, supra note 2, at 851, 852; Surrey, supra note 25, at 821. 
127 Surrey, supra note 25, at 821. 
128 Caplin, supra note 2, at 851, 852. 
129 Surrey, supra note 105, at 438. 
130 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2037 (a) (2). 
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2039 (a)181 in order to tax any annuity obtainable only by surviving 
the decedent. Finally, Mr. Surrey would repeal section 2039 (c),132 
which now exempts from the estate tax annuities paid by qualified 
employee pension plans.133 
3. Sales of Life Interests. Mr. Surrey would change the law 
now applied to sale of life interests. His proposal is to deny any 
basis, treat the entire proceeds as ordinary income, and attempt to 
avoid "lumping" into one tax year income which absent sale would 
have been received over many years. The latter result would be 
accomplished by applying a marginal rate ascertained from the 
taxpayer's marginal rates in the five years preceding sale. If this 
deters sales of life interests, Mr. Surrey is not worried because he 
does not see any reason why life tenants should sell their interests.134 
4. Deferred Compensation. Finally, Mr. Surrey is concerned 
with the avoidance devices in the corporate executive compensa-
tion area. Most of these have been treated earlier-new laws for 
stock options and pension trust terminations and tougher enforce-
ment in the fringe benefit area. In addition, he believes that in-
dividual deferred-compensation plans should be subjected to 
coverage requirements similar to those now imposed upon tax-
benefited non-discriminatory pension plans.1311 
H. The Low-Bracket Shelters 
There are certain tax preferences benefiting primarily low-
bracket taxpayers. These, too, have been criticized. Slated for 
elimination if the new officials both have their way are the sick-pay 
exclusion, the retirement income credit, and the exemption of 
Social Security payments.136 Mr. Caplin would eliminate the re-
tirement income credit but does not discuss the exclusion of 
Social Security payments.137 In view of the creation of the retire-
ment income credit partially for the purpose of equalizing treat-
ment of those who do and those who do not receive Social 
Security,138 his proposal is subject to the criticism that it simply 
131 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (a). 
132 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (c). 
133 Surrey, supra note 105, at 438, 439. 
134 Surrey, supra note 105, at 441. 
135 Surrey, supra note 25, at 822 n.31. 
136 Caplin, supra note 2, at 845, 846; Surrey, supra note 25, at 823. 
137 Caplin, supra note 2, at 845, 846. 
138 Surrey, supra note 25, at 823. 
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restores the previous inequity. Mr. Surrey's suggestion of elimi-
nating both benefits would produce more horizontal equity in the 
tax system.189 Mr. Surrey doubts generally the wisdom of favor-
ing elderly taxpayers with an extra exemption, extra medical 
deduction allowance, the retirement income credit, and the Social 
Security exclusion.14° Furthermore, he is concerned with exemp-
tion, often at the behest of organized labor, of wage earners' fringe 
benefits. He apparently would halt the trend toward exempting 
more fringe benefits and where possible would reverse it. He 
proposes serious study of the conceptual and administrative prob-
lems involved in the present exemption of employer-paid medical 
expenses and board and lodging, and the problems which will be 
involved if company-paid vacations and the like become more 
common.141 Mr. Surrey advocates elimination of the child care 
deduction as being minor, complicated, and only on the border-
line of business expenses. However, he does not consider this a 
first order of business.142 
I. A New Tax Court and a New Code 
Finally, in the area of specific reforms, Mr. Caplin proposes 
study of the need for a court of tax appeals to dispose finally of all 
but constitutional issues in tax litigation, and the need for a paid 
commission to study thoroughly the possibility of drafting a new 
code.143 
V. CONCLUSION: A LOWER RATE STRUCTURE PLUS 
BROADENING OF THE TAX BASE 
Mr. Surrey estimates that his increases in the tax base would 
produce approximately an extra twelve billion dollars at present 
rates and that his proposed reduced rate structure applied to his 
proposed new base would bring in approximately the same total 
revenue as is now received.144 This rate structure would have a 
top rate of approximately sixty-five percent with the other rates 
reduced by approximately twenty-five percent from today's level.145 
130 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Surrey, supra note 25, at 824. 
142 Surrey, supra note 25, at 826. 
143 Caplin, supra note 2, at 853. 
144 Surrey, supra note 25, at 829. 
145Ibid. 
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Mr. Surrey would consider, and Mr. Caplin proposes, a splitting 
of the bottom bracket with a ten percent bottom rate on the first 
two thousand dollars of taxable income.146 Both officials advocate 
introduction of some type of averaging provision for ordinary 
income.147 
While Mr. Surrey estimates that the effect of the increase in 
the tax base would be equivalent to the effect of the lower rates 
when total revenue is considered, he does not give any estimated 
comparison of the two effects for particular income brackets. In 
other words, he does not give an opinion on whether the average 
amount paid by individual taxpayers in a particular bracket 
would be more or less if his proposals were adopted. The tax 
shelters he attacks are by no means evenly distributed up and down 
the rate scale, but are concentrated in: the high-bracket areas, ·with 
the result that the actual average effective rates in the high brackets 
are already substantially below the stated rates.148 One can im-
agine that legislators of all political hues would be interested in 
knowing whether the average amount paid by individual high and 
low bracket taxpayers will actually be more or less if the proposed 
legislation is adopted. The late Randolph Paul, in proposing 
substantially similar reforms, indicated that if they were enacted 
most high bracket taxpayers would actually pay more in total 
taxes.149 
The stated reason of the two me~ for their proposals is a pres-
ent and increasing ineffectiveness of the income tax caused prima-
rily by the difficulty of administration and low taxpayer morale.urn 
Numerous other writers have advanced similar proposals for simi-
lar reasons.151 However, not all authorities agree on the reasons 
for the reforms. Walter J. Blum, Chicago University tax specialist, 
sees neither a noticeable drop in taxpayer morale nor great diffi-
culties in administration of the law. In his opinion, the most 
vociferous supporters of a broadening of the tax base are those who 
146 Caplin, supra note 2, at 845; Surrey, supra note 25, at 830. 
147 Caplin, supra note 2, at 846; Surrey, in 1955 Hearings 314; Surrey, supra note 24, 
at 1018. 
148 Surrey, supra note 25, at 815, 816; Musgrave, How Progressive Is the Income Tax, 
in 3 1959 COMPENDIUM 2223, 2230. 
149 Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and the Rate Structure, 11 TAX L. R.Ev. 203, 220 
(1956). 
150 Caplin, supra note 2, at 839, 840; Surrey, supra note 2, at A3053. 
151 See, e.g., the bibliography given in Surrey, supra note 25, at 817 n.14 and in Surrey, 
supra note 4, at 1146 n.3. 
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desire, or feel the inevitability of, greater federal expenditures in 
the near future and want an effective instrument for raising the 
revenue. He claims personally to favor base broadening and rate 
lowering solely on grounds of fairness. Blum sees at present an 
uneasy alliance between those who want primarily a broader base 
and those who want primarily lower rates, and doubts the stability 
of the alliance.152 His comments raise the question of the likeli-
hood of enactment of the proposed changes. 
Mr. Surrey has anticipated certain of the political reactions to 
his suggestions. He believes the problem attacked to be one com-
mon to all nations with progressive income taxation and notes that 
conservatives have generally been fairly effective in legislating 
shelters from high rates. The conservative, says Mr. Surrey, favors 
lower rates; but elimination of tax shelters with no effective safe-
guard against renewal of high rates leaves the wealthy taxpayer 
in danger of a much more painful tax bite than ever suffered 
before.153 The conservative viewpoint anticipated by Mr. Surrey 
has already been voiced by the president of the National Associa-
tion of Real Estate Boards, who asks, "What assurances would the 
American people have that once they had given up all these deduc-
tions, the next Congress wouldn't start pushing up the rates to 
meet the cost of expanding the welfare state?"154 
Mr. Surrey believes the liberal to be in no less a dilemma on 
the question of reducing rates in return for base-broadening. The 
liberal legislator must explain to his constituents a most obvious 
rate cut from ninety-one percent to sixty-five percent on the in-
comes of the very wealthy, in return for elimination of shelters 
whose nature is comprehended only vaguely, if at all.155 Appar-
ently Mr. Surrey fears intransigent opposition by organized labor; 
he has spent some time contending that if labor does not make 
compromises to improve the income tax it will face a federal sales 
tax.150 
Finally, every tax shelter attacked is defended by a vociferous 
and powerful pressure group. Their combined influences focused 
152 Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Tax Base, in 1 1959 
COMPENDIUM 77-78, 81. For an example of one who wants reform in order to improve 
the revenue-raising capacity, see Mills, Preface to Federal Taxation 1958, 44 VA. L. REv. 
835, 837 (1958). 
153 Surrey, supra note 4, at 1150. 
154 Powell, Wall St. Journal, April 3, 1960, p. 14, col. 5. 
155 Surrey, supra note 4, at 1150. 
156 Surrey, supra note 2, at A3055. 
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on a congressman could be awesome indeed. The consideration of 
all of the difficulties facing large-scale base-broadening and rate re-
duction led Professor Blum to predict, in a congressional study of 
the matter in 1959, that the ensuing year would see more tax 
havens rather than fewer, in the Internal Revenue Code.157 
David G. Hill, S.Ed. 
157 Blum, supra note 152, at 82. 
